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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceedings below are Plaintiffs/Respondents Ignacio and Esther
Buenrostro and Defendant/Respondent Whitney A. Nesbitt. Defendant Jacob C. Loveland

has been dismissed from the case and is not a party to the instant appeal. The Petitioner,
Intermountain Surgical LLC is not a party to the proceeding below. Intermountain seeks
extraordinary relief from the District Court's order requiring it to produce proprietary
documents and 3O(b)(6) testimony in response to Defendant/Respondent Whitney A.
Nesbitt's subpoena duces tecum.
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 78A-4-103(1), 78A-4103(2)G), and UtahR App. P. 19.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Whether the District Court correctly interpreted and determined the
relevancy and proportionality standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b) with respect to discovery
requests to a non-party to the litigation?

Standard of Review: This Court reviews the application and interpretation
of a rule of procedure for correctness. State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, ,r 18, 357 P.3d
554.

Preservation: This issue was preserved in the District Court, see Order,
attached as Addendum I.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES

(b) Discovery scope.
(b)(1) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards of
proportionality set forth below. Privileged matters that are not discoverable or admissible
in any proceeding of any kind or character include all information in any form provided
during and created specifically as part of a request for an investigation, the investigation,
findings, or conclusions of peer review, care review, or quality assurance processes of
any organization of health care providers as defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act for the purpose of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to
improve the quality of medical care, or for the purpose of peer review of the ethics,
competence, or professional conduct of any health care provider.
(b)(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if:
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(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the complexity of the case, the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues;
(b)(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden
or expense;
(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and
will further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case;
(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative;
(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is
more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; and
(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to
obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into account the parties'
relative access to the information.
(b )(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing
proportionality and relevance. To ensure proportionality, the court may enter orders
under Rule 37.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case, course ofproceeding, and disposition below
This petition arises from the District Court's denial of Petitioner Intermountain
Surgical, LLC's ("Intermountain") motion for a protective order related to the discovery of
confidential proprietary business information. (6/1/17 Order on Non-Party's Motion for
Protective Order ("Order"), attached as addendum 1.)1 This Order contradicts two other
district court orders granting Intermountain a protective order over the same information.
(3/8/17 Memo iso Motion for Protective Order ("Memo"), pp. iv-v.)
1

The record from the District Court has not been forwarded to this Court for purposes of
appeal. Counsel was directed by the Clerk of the Court to cite to the record by docket
entry date and name of document.
5

Plaintiffs, Ignacio Buenrostro and Esther Buenrostro, brought this action against
defendants Whitney Nesbitt and Jacob Loveland for personal injuries sustained in an auto
accident. (3/30/16 Complaint.)

Intennountain is not a party to this litigation.

(Id.)

Intermountain' s involvement in the case was limited to providing estimates for surgeries
contemplated by the Plaintiffs back in 2014. (Memo, p. ii.) Intennountain is aware that Dr.
Kade T. Huntsman consulted with each of the Plaintiffs about future surgery in December
of 2014. (Id.) Intermountain has not been involved with any treatment or surgeries that the
Plaintiffs may have had since December 2014. Likewise, Intermountain has no lien or
contract with the Plaintiffs. (Id.)
Under the guise of defending this lawsuit, Defendant's insurance carrier Farmers
Insurance ("Farmers") directed its appointed attorneys to serve a 30(b)(6) notice to
Intermountain, with the express intent of obtaining confidential proprietary, business
information. (Memo at Ex. 1.) Intermountain moved the court for a protective order,
arguing that the information sought was proprietary trade secrets and/or did not meet the
proportionality test under Rule 26. (Id., pp. 1-8.) The District Court denied Intermountain's
motion and ordered that Intermountain produce various proprietary documents and 30(b)(6)
testimony. See Order.

futerrnountain filed a petition for extraordinary relief from the

District Court's order.

The Court requested further briefmg from the parties on

Intermountain' s petition.
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FACTS

Background Facts
futermountain is an entity that facilitates surgical treatment for patients who do not
have health insurance. fu so doing, futermountain leases a surgical suite from Canyon Crest
Surgical Center. Intermountain owns and maintains all of the surgical equipment used for
these surgeries at its own expense. Intermountain is responsible for the acquisition and
purchase of the surgical supplies, surgical implants and hardware used in these surgeries
and does so through its own efforts via negotiation of contracted rates. (See Memo, pp. ii, 25; id. at Ex. 11, p. 3; id. at Ex. 23, pp. 12-14.)
In cases where futermountain actually provides its services to patients, each of the
surgeries performed include "professional fees" and "facilities fees." (Memo at Ex. 11 pp.
3-4; id. at Ex. 24

,r,r

7-8.) The professional fees are those charged by the medical

professionals such as surgeons, anesthesiologists and physician's assistants. (Id. at Ex. 24,

,r,r

6-8.)

contractors.

The medical professionals who provide medical services are independent

(Id. at Ex. 11, p. 4.) There are several surgeons in the area who perform

surgeries for futermountain patients.
Intermountain directly.

These surgeons and other professionals bill

futermountain pays the medical professionals for the services

rendered without reduction. Intermountain includes the fees paid for medical professional
services in a statement that includes "CPT" codes. (Id., at p. 2; id at Ex. 24,
Ex. 23, pp. 12-13.)

,r,r 6-8; id. at

futermountain charges the patient exactly what the medical

professionals charge futennountain, with no "up charge."
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Intermountain is not a medical professional and therefore does not charge
professional fees. However, Intermountain is a facilities provider and charges a facility fee.

(Id., Ex. 24

,,r 7-8; id.

at Ex. 23, pp. 12-13.) Intermountain's invoices to patients include

facility fees and CPT codes that are similar to the facility fees charged by other facility
providers. (Id., p. 2.) These charges include the use of the surgical suite, equipment,
surgical supplies and surgical implants/hardware used in these surgeries. (Id., Ex. 24, ,r,r 78, 11, 19; id. at Ex. 11, p. 3-4; id. at Ex. 17, p. 1.) Intermountain considers the pricing
analysis it has performed and continues to perform to be proprietary trade secrets, research,
development and commercial information, which if disclosed would prejudice its ongoing
business efforts. (Memo, pp. 1-8.)
When Intermountain provides services to patients, Intermountain and the patient
enter into a lien agreement wherein Intermountain agrees to accept deferred payment of the
charges for medical and facilities services until after a patient receives a recovery by way of
settlement or verdict. However, even if there is no recovery, the patient is responsible for
payment. (Id. at Ex. 11, p. 3.)
The foregoing is what occurs when Intermountain provides its services to patients.
However, in this case Intermountain did not provide any services to the plaintiffs. (Memo,
p. ii.) Intermountain has not paid any medical professionals or provided facilities services
for either Plaintiff. (Id.) Intermountain did not enter into any contractual agreements with
the plaintiffs and Intermountain has no lien rights. (Id.) Intermountain's only involvement
in this case occurred in December of 2014. At that time, Intermountain was approached by
Plaintiffs' counsel for a surgical referral. Intermountain provided Plaintiffs with a referral
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to Dr. Huntsman, an orthopedic surgeon who practices at the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic.
Plaintiffs presented to Dr. Huntsman at the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic on December 15,
2014, for a medical consultation. (Id.) Thereafter, on December 18, 2014, Plaintiffs'
counsel asked Intennountain to provide estimates for what the costs would be if the
Plaintiffs decided to undergo the surgeries recommended by Dr. Huntsman. As requested,
Intennountain provided the estimates to Plaintiffs' counsel. These were simple estimates
and did not include CPT codes that would normally be on an actual statement for services.

(Id., p. ii; id., Ex. 2.)

After December 18, 2014, Intennountain had no additional

involvement with the Plaintiffs, their attorney or anyone else associated with the case until
November 11, 2016, when Farmers served a subpoena upon Intennountain for the
Plaintiffs' medical records. (Id., p. ii.)
Petitioner responded to Farmers' subpoena in this case by producing the medical
records it had with respect to the Plaintiffs. (Id. at Ex. 2.) These records consisted of Dr.
Huntsman's report and the estimates of the costs of the recommended surgeries. (Id.)
Thereafter, Farmers served a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice upon Intermountain. The Rule
30(b)(6) notice gave notice of an obvious attempt by Farmers to obtain confidential
proprietary business information and processes including Intennountain's internal records
and analysis of profit, overhead, studies and subscriptions purchased by Intermountain,
analysis and processes developed by Intermountain, and other trade secrets. (See Order.) In
addition, Farmers gave notice that it would require Intennountain to identify expert
qualifications of its employees who would provide expert testimony in the instant case.
(Id.)

9

After receiving Fanners' Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice, futermountain filed a
Motion for Protective Order. (See Memo.) Intermountain argued that Farmers could not
meet its burden of showing that the requested information was relevant and proportional
pursuant to Rule 26(b) as amended in 2011. Additionally, Intennountain argued that the
information was confidential proprietary business information, processes and trade secrets
pursuant to Utah Code § 13-24-2. (Id.) Finally, Intermountain argued that it has not been
designated as an expert and has already represented that it is not qualified as an expert.
Intermountain has no intention of testifying as an expert in this, or any other litigation.
(3/22/17 Reply Memo in Support of Protective Order, p. 8.)
Despite the fact that Intermountain did not provide services to the Plaintiffs, did not
have a contract/lien agreement with the Plaintiffs, and had only provided a referral and
estimates to the Plaintiffs, Farmers argued that "[b]ecause Petitioner will obtain a lien on the
[Plaintiffs'] recovery in this litigation to finance the surgery proposed by Dr. Huntsman it
has a strong incentive or bias to testify that the charges are reasonable and customary." (See
3/15/17 Defense Memorandum in Response to futermountain Surgical Motion for
Protective Order, p. 11.) In other words, even though the Plaintiffs have not had surgery,
because they might have surgery sometime in the future, it argued Intermountain might be
the provider.

Based upon this non-existent hypothetical scenario, Farmers claimed

entitlement to unprecedented access to Intermountain's confidential proprietary business
information, processes and trade secrets.
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After the May 9, 2017, telephonic hearing on Intennountain's Motion for Protective
Order, the District Court granted Farmers' request and required Intennountain to produce its
confidential proprietary business information, processes and trade secrets. (See Order.)
This is not the frrst time that liability carriers have attempted to obtain
Intennountain' s confidential data, but it is the first time that a court has interpreted Rule 26
to require its production. In Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, Farmers attempted to obtain
substantially the same information. Intennountain filed a Motion for Protective Order,
which was heard by Judge Bates on December 8, 2016. In his January 11, 2017, order,
Judge Bates significantly limited the scope of Farmers' inquiry and entered a strict
Protective Order. See Decision and Order, Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, No. 160903969
(January 11, 2017), attached as addendum 2, and Protective Order, Vigueras-Amezcua v.
Shoeman, No. 160903969 (January 16, 2017), attached as addendum 3.

Prior to the

Vigueras-Amezcua case, Intennountain had a similar experience with another liability

insurance company in Salisbury v. The Living Planet. In Salisbury, Judge Scott granted
Petitioner's Motion for Protective Order. See Intermountain Surgical' s Order Granting
Motion for Protective Order, Salisbury v. The Living Planet, No. 130905519 (December 14,
2015), attached as addendum 4.

In this case, the District Court diverged from the

interpretations of Judge Bates and Judge Scott and granted Farmers unprecedented and
expansive access to Intermountain' s confidential proprietary business information,
processes and trade secrets. (See Order.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A protective order is necessary to prevent Farmers' ongoing disproportionate
discovery requests aimed at obtaining irrelevant, confidential, proprietary and protected
information from Intermountain. Under Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
before a discovery request is initiated, the matters sought must be: (1) relevant to a "claim
or defense" and (2) proportional to the needs of the case. In this case, the District Court
failed to properly apply Rule 26.
First, Rule 26 requires that discovery be relevant to a "claim or defense." Farmers
argued its request was relevant to Plaintiffs' future medical expenses. Under Utah law,
future medical expenses are determined by the price that those services sell for in the
marketplace. However, instead of analyzing whether Farmers' discovery request was
relevant to determining the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' medical expenses, the District
Court analyzed the relevancy of the discovery as pertains to questions that are not even at
issue in this case.
Second, Rule 26 requires the request to be proportional to the needs of the case.
This element analyzes whether the information sought is important to a parties' claim or
defense, and whether the same or similar information can be obtained from another
source. As stated above, Farmers claims to need information from lntermountain to
determine/dispute the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' future surgical expenses. However,
the information that Farmers seeks (including, among other things, Intermountain's
profit-margins, contracts, business model, etc.) is not important to determining the
reasonable value of future medical expenses and Farmers admits its expert can testify
12

regarding the value and necessity of those expenses. In this case, the District Court did
not analyze whether the information requested is important to calculating Plaintiffs'
future surgical expenses. Nor did it analyze whether Farmers could obtain information
regarding the value and necessity of future surgical expenses from another source.
Instead, the District Court appeared to analyze whether Intermountain' s proprietary
information could be, without great burden, obtained from another source. That analysis
is error on its face.

If that were the test, proprietary information would always be

discoverable.
Applying the correct legal analysis, the information that Farmers requested, and
that the District Court ordered to be produced, was not discoverable under Rule 26.
Intermountain therefore requests that the District Court's Order be reversed and that it be
directed to grant Intermountain's motion for a protective order.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Information Farmers Seeks is Irrelevant and Disproportional to the
Needs of the Personal Injury Action.
Farmers subpoena request to Intermountain seeks information that is irrelevant and

disproportional to the determination of the Plaintiffs' future medical damages. "It is well
established that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of
discovery under Rule 26(b)." XPO Logistics Freight, Inc. v. YRC, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 165323, *10, 2016 WL 6996275; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 45 Advisory
Committee Notes (equating a subpoena to discovery).

Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure outlines the scope of permissible discovery. Under this rule, "[p]arties
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may discover any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l).
Thus, to be discoverable under Utah R. Civ. P. 26, the information sought must be ( 1)
relevant to any party's "claim or defense" and (2) proportional to the needs of the case.
The Rule further provides that "the party seeking discovery always has the burden of
showing proportionality and relevance." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). In this case, the
District Court misapplied the test set forth in Rule 26.

The information sought by

Farmers is neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of the parties in this case.

A.

The District Court erred in its application of Rule 26 when it failed to
analyze the relevancy of Farmers' subpoena request as relates to the
parties' claims and defenses.

The district court abused its discretion because it failed to properly determine
whether the information sought by Farmers was relevant to any "claim or defense" set
forth in this case. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Relevant evidence is evidence that "has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
the fact is of consequence of determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. The only claim
asserted by Plaintiffs against Defendant is for negligence. (See Complaint.) The elements
of negligence are well known: duty, breach causation, and damages. Rose v. Provo City,
2003 UT App 77, ~ 7, 67 P.3d 1017.

Farmers argued that the discovery it seeks is relevant to the issue of damages (i.e,
the amount and necessity of Plaintiffs' future surgeries). However, Farmers did not
demonstrate below and the District Court did not analyze how Intermountain' s business
information (including, among other things profit margins, contracts, costs, risk
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assessment, and business/plans) is relevant to determining the reasonable amount of the
Plaintiffs' future surgical expenses. See, e.g., Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah
1997) (reversing district court's decision regarding protective order when court failed to
properly analyze whether the information sought was pertinent to the actual issue in the
case.)
Under Utah law, the reasonableness of a plaintiffs medical expenses is
determined by the price those services sell for in the marketplace as demonstrated by
comparing the prices of what other providers charge for the same services in the
community. This determination is not made based on a specific provider's profit margin,
contracts, overhead, lease payments, rent, etc.
Thompson & Ostler, 2015 UT 60,

1

See, e.g., Jones v. Mackey Price

58, 355 P.3d 1000 (holding that, in cases of

professional services, the reasonable value of those services normally equates to the
market value of those services); Express Recovery Servs. v. Reuling, 2015 UT App 299,

11 14-15, 364 P.3d 766 (the proper measure

of damages for professional services is the

reasonable value of those services in the marketplace).
Other jurisdictions similarly hold that the value of medical services is determined
based upon the price those services sell for in the relevant community. See CharlotteMecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Talford, 727 S.E.2d 866, 870 (N.C. 2012) ("[I]t is

appropriate when determining what a service is 'reasonably worth' to look to 'the time
and labor expended, skill, knowledge and experience involved, and other attendant
circumstances, rather than . . . the benefit to the person for whom the services are
rendered. Those 'other attendant circumstances' include the rates charged by similar
15

market participants in similar geographic areas to perform similar work at the relevant
time." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Kunz v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp.
& Health Care Ctrs., 869 N.E.2d 328, 337-338 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the

reasonable amount of medical expenses is determined by the "customary charges for
services in a similar geographic area in which the services are provided"); Bielar v.
Washoe Health Sys., 306 P.3d 360 (Nev. 2013) (granting summary judgment against

party who attempted to prove the unreasonableness of medical expenses by the cost-plus
method (cost plus reasonable mark-up) because the value of medical services is
determined by the price those services sell for in the marketplace, not by profit margin);
Restatement 2d of Torts, § 911 (price of services is determined by the price those services
sell for in the marketplace). 2
One need only look to other institutions to show the fallacy of Farmers' argument
that Intermountain's business information is somehow relevant to any determination in
this case.

For example IHC, St. Marks/Mountain Star, IASIS, University of Utah

Hospital, as well as other outpatient surgical centers are legal entities/corporations. They
own and/or lease buildings and facilities and are "facilities" which charge facilities fees
with the proper CPT coding. They equip those facilities so that medical care providers
can provide medical care to patients. They arrange medical care for patients by way of
their employees as well as independent contractors who are qualified medical
2

Generally, if Intermountain contracts to perform services for patients the invoice that is
provided by Intermountain to the patients identifies the services provided, the CPT codes
and the charges for the services provided. This information, along with the Plaintiffs'
medical records provides all the necessary information required for Farmers to perform
its own analysis of whether charges are reasonable and customary.
16

professionals. They charge patients for use of the facilities they own or lease. They also
charge for medical care provided by qualified medical care providers. It goes without
saying that their medical charges include profit.

Otherwise, they would go out of
~

business. 3

If IHC, St. Marks/Mountain Star, IASIS, University of Utah Hospital, or others
similarly situated were on the receiving end of subpoenas and 30(b)(6) notices similar to
those served by Farmers in this and other cases, these entities would inevitably respond
the same way as Intermountain has. It would be surprising if a court allowed Farmers to
delve into IHC's or St. Marks contractual relationships with medical care personnel or
vendors because the information is irrelevant/inadmissible, confidential, and proprietary
business information. Likewise, it would be beyond the pale to require IHC or St. Marks
to disclose how much they paid for overhead, supplies, equipment, employees,
independent contractors, etc. 4
Another example outside of the medical context is the method generally employed
to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees. Compare Express Recovery Servs.,
2015 UT App 299 (determining value of medical services based on price services sell for
in the marketplace) with Jones, 2015 UT 60 (determining value of legal services based on
price of services in the marketplace). In determining the reasonableness of attorney's
Farmers is a "for profit" enterprise and presumably makes a profit. Otherwise, Farmers
would not be able to justify retaining two law offices in different states to defend a
relatively uncomplicated personal injury case.
4 On several occasions Intermountain has requested that Farmers identify other cases
where it has burdened providers like IHC, St. Marks or other surgical centers in Utah
with the same intrusive discovery. However, to date, Farmers has not responded with
even one example.
3
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fees, courts look to what other attorneys of like experience charge for similar services in
similar cases. Jones, 2015 UT 60. Courts do not delve into the law firm's books to see
how much they pay their employees or independent contractors, how much they pay for
their computers, how much they pay for office space, or whether they lease or own their
copy machines. As one court noted, engaging in such an analysis would present myriad
problems and result in the unnecessary analysis and presentation of evidence that is
beyond what is needed to determine the reasonableness of a fee:
Is every single item of cost incurred by a firm (e.g., both capital
expenditures and costs of operations) to be part of the calculation? What
special rules must be adopted in order to avoid punishing law firm
efficiency or a firm's skill or luck in negotiating favorable leases or vendor
contracts? Is every single item of revenue received by a firm to be included
in the calculation (e.g., what about investment income)? How will the
quality of the legal services be incorporated into the analysis? What about
other intangibles, like professional reputation and goodwill? Will the firm
be forced to disclose the compensation it pays to every lawyer and staff
member? Will it be forced to disclose the amounts it pays for office space,
equipment, supplies, furniture or utilities? Will it be forced to disclose the
individuals or entities to whom it makes these payments? What portion of
the attorney's overall costs of doing business should be allocated to the
particular case in which the fee dispute arises?

Shaffer v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1001, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506 (1995).
Instead of analyzing whether the discovery sought by Farmers is relevant to the
reasonableness and necessity of Plaintiffs' future medical expenses, Farmers persuaded
the District Court to "go off into the weeds" so to speak and analyze the relevancy of the
discovery sought as pertains to questions that are not even pertinent in this case.
Specifically, the Court held that Fanners was entitled to Intermountain's proprietary
business information because this information was relevant to the determination of:
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(1) Whether Intennountain is a medical provider or a collateral
source provider (i.e., someone who pays for medical services),
(2) the factual foundation for the estimated cost of surgery that was
provided by Intermountain to determine whether the estimate represents
reasonable or customary charges or collateral source payments that might
be made; and
(3) the

contractual relationship

between Intermountain and

Plaintiffs' expert (Dr. Huntsman), who has been designated to provide
testimony regarding the value of Plaintiffs' future surgeries. (Order, p. 2.)
That is not the correct legal analysis. Under Rule 26, the District Court was
required to analyze the relevancy of the information sought as relates to the claims and
defenses made in this case. As described above, the only claim or defense Farmers
identified was the future surgical damages claimed by the Plaintiffs. The court, therefore,
should have analyzed the test for determining future medical expenses under Utah law
and then analyzed whether the information sought would resolve that issue. By deviating
from the correct legal analysis, the District Court focused on the resolution of three issues
that are not even pertinent to this case.
The first two issues identified by the District Court relate to the determination of
whether Intermountain is a medical provider or a collateral source provider. But what
does that matter? Intermountain's status is not in dispute in this case. Intermouata.in has
not provided any services to the Plaintiffs (medical or collateral).

Nor does

Intermountain have a contract to provide any services for the Plaintiffs. Intennountain
19

has already disclosed all documents contained in its files as relates to the Plaintiffs. The
only information it has regarding this case is a surgical estimate that it provided in 2014.
Farmers' speculation that Intermountain "might" provide some services in the future does
not provide a basis under Rule 26 for it to go on a "fishing expedition" through
Intermountain' s proprietary business records so that it can defend an issue that is not even
being litigated in this case.

Moreover, it is unclear how determining the status of

Interrnountain is helpful in determining the marketprice for surgical services in the
community.
The third issue-the contractual relationship between Dr. Huntsman and
Intermountain-is also not being litigated in this case. Moreover, as stated above, there
is no contract to provide medical services to the Plaintiffs. If Farmers means to imply
that Dr. Huntsman's opinions of what is "reasonable and customary" are skewed because
he allegedly charges and is paid more than is customary in the industry, Farmers should
dispute Dr. Huntsman's testimony with relevant evidence (i.e., prices charged for similar
services in the community). 5

5

Although not at issue in this case, Farmers admits that Intermountain's financial
relationship with its clients likely constitutes a collateral source. (3/15/17 Defense
Memorandum in Response, p. 6.) Other Utah district courts have similarly held that the
financial relationship between Intermountain and its clients constitutes irrelevant
collateral source information. See addendums 2-4. The Utah Supreme Court has
likewise held that "[h]ow a plaintiff satisfies his medical expense obligations presents a
separate issue that is irrelevant to the calculation of his damages." Wilson v. IHC Hasps.,
Inc., 2012 UT 43,138,289 P.3d 369.
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B.

Farmers did not satisfy its burden that the confidential and
proprietary information that it seeks is proportional discovery.

The District Court also failed to properly apply the proportionality test outlined in
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). Rule 26(b)(2) outlines that discovery requests are
proportional if:
(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the complexity of the case, the parties' resources,
the importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues;
(b)(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden
or expense;
(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and
will further the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the case;
(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative;
(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is
more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; and
(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to
obtain the information by discovery or otherwise, taking into account the
parties' relative access to the information.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
The theme underlying all of these factors is that there must be a legitimate need
for the information requested based on the claims and defenses in the case and that the
party cannot obtain the same information from another source that is more convenient,
less burdensome, or less expensive. See also Utah R. Civ. P. 45(e)(5) (stating that only
"[i]f the party or attorney responsible for issuing the subpoena shows a substantial need
for the information that cannot be met without undue hardship, the court may order
compliance upon specified conditions.")
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The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Chatterton, 938 P.2d 255, is useful in
demonstrating the correct application of the proportionality test. In that case, the plaintiff
sought to discover the following from his insurance carrier: the "(1) complete case file
information on cases involving specified circumstances similar to Chatterton's accident
and injuries, (2) comprehensive information on [the insurer's] policies and procedures for
handling uninsured motorist claims, and (3) detailed information on all internal aspects of
the insurer's processing of Chatterton's claim from its insurance carrier." Id. at 262. The
plaintiff argued that he needed this information to prove the elements of liability and
damages as relates to his personal injury claim. Plaintiff also argued that he could not
obtain the same information from another source. The district court agreed. On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court noted that, under Utah law, liability
and the amount and necessity of a plaintiffs damages is dependent upon the unique
circumstances of each case.

The court held that information regarding the insurer's

policies and procedures and what the insurer paid on claims for similar injuries was
therefore not important to resolve the issue of damages or liability. The court further held
that the plaintiff could obtain information regarding the amount of his damages from an
expert.
Here, the District Court failed to properly analyze (1) the importance and need for
the information sought as compared to (2) the burden imposed upon Intermountain.
First, even assuming that Intermountain' s proprietary information is somehow relevant,
which it is not, this information is not important or needed to determine or dispute the
amount or necessity of damages in this case.
22

As described above, delving through

Intermountain' s proprietary records regarding its charges, payments, contracts, costs, and
other pricing information will provide little, to no help, determining the necessity or
market price for the plaintiffs' future medical expenses. Additionally, Farmers has the
ability, and almost unlimited resources, to have a third party review the charges based
upon CPT codes as well as Farmers' own internal data bases. Indeed, Farmers has
already obtained the information relevant to this determination from another source, and
admits that its expert will testify that Plaintiffs' future surgeries are not necessary and the
amount plaintiffs' expert is asserting for those surgeries is excessive compared to the
amount typically charged in the community.

(3/15/17 Defense Memorandum m

Response to Intermountain Surgical Motion for Protective Order, pp. 3-6.)6
Second, the burden on Intermountain in providing this information 1s not
insignificant.

Intermountain will be forced to divert resources from its business

operations so that it can gather the requested information, meet with its attorneys to
ensure that its proprietary information is properly marked and protected, prepare the
30(b)(6) witness to be knowledgeable about the relevant subject matter, hire an attorney
to attend the deposition, and incur expenses sending its employee and attorney to attend
the deposition.

The nature of the request is also highly intrusive.

Much of the

information sought is proprietary business information. The District Court did not hold
otherwise.

Moreover, the District Court ordered that Intermountain's proprietary

6

Chatterton was decided prior to the 2011 amendments to Rule 26. The current version
of the Rule anticipates that the Court will take a more active role in determining the
relevancy and proportionality of discovery and places the burden of proving both
elements on the party seeking the discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b) and Advisory
Committee Notes.
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information be released to the in-house attorneys for Farmers-a company that
Intermountain views as its adversary and that, in Intermountain's view, has attempted to
violate protective orders pertaining to Intennountain in the past. (See Memo, Ex. 23
(Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt).)
Although unclear, the District Court appears to have held that the request for
Intermountain's proprietary information is proportional because Farmers could not obtain
(without great burden) this information from another source. (See Order, p. 2.) That
reasoning is error on its face. If that were the test, proprietary infonnation would always
be discoverable.

Of course Farmers could not obtain Intermountain' s proprietary

information from another source and for good reason-it is proprietary. That is not the
test. The appropriate inquiry is whether Farmers can obtain the information it needs to
determine/defend the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' future medical expenses. Farmers
already demonstrated that it can. The District Court erred in holding otherwise, and this
Court should reverse.
C.

Applying the correct legal analysis, the information that Farmers seeks
is not relevant and proportional.

As described above, the District Court misapplied Rule 26. Pursuant to this Rule,
the District Court should have analyzed whether the information requested was relevant
to determining the reasonable amount of Plaintiffs' future surgical expenses (i.e., the
price for the surgery in the marketplace). Then, if this threshold burden was met, the
District Court should have analyzed whether Farmers could have obtained the
information from another source that was less burdensome, costly, or convenient.
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Applying the correct legal analysis, it is clear that Farmers did not meet its burden as
relates to each of the items that the District Court ordered to be produced:
1.

Farmers did not meet its burden in establishing that the production of
information regarding Intermountain' s licenses and accreditations is
relevant and proportional:

Intennountain' s licenses and accreditations are not relevant to determining what
the market price is for a future surgical procedure. (Order, p. 4,

'if'il

1-3.) The market

price is determined by the prices charged in the community. Supra, pp. 14-17. Farmers
can determine the market price through the use of an expert.
2.

Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of information
regarding the number of surgeries performed by Dr. Huntsman for
Intermountain and the fees paid by Intermountain to Dr. Huntsman is
relevant and proportional.

The number of surgeries performed by Dr. Huntsman for Intermountain and the
total fees charged associated with those surgeries is not relevant to determining the
market price of Plaintiffs' future medical expenses. (Order, p. 4,

'if'il 4-5.)

The market

price is determined by comparing the prices charged in the community. Supra, pp. 14-17.
Additionally, the prices associated with other peoples' surgeries, does not equate to the
necessity or price of the Plaintiffs' surgeries which depends on the Plaintiffs' unique
circumstances. Moreover, the parties in this case can obtain information regarding the
reasonable amount and necessity of Plaintiffs' surgeries through expert testimony.
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3.

Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of information
regarding when, how. and by whom the Plaintiffs were referred to
Intermountain is relevant and proportional.

Who, when, and how Intermountain was referred to Plaintiffs is irrelevant in the
resolution of the amount or degree of Plaintiffs' damages, which is determined by the
price of the particular surgical service in the marketplace. (See Order, p. 4,

,r,r

6-7.)

Intermountain has not provided or been contracted to provide· any surgical services for
Plaintiffs. Farmers can obtain information regarding the reasonable amount of Plaintiffs'
surgeries through expert testimony.
4.

Farmers did not meet its burden that the production of information
underlying Intermountain' s formula for determining its prices is
relevant and proportional.

Intermountain' s proprietary information for determining its prices is not relevant
to Plaintiffs' future damages. (Id., p. 4-6,

,r,r 8,

9, 12, 13, 14, 15.) Plaintiffs' future

damages are determined by the surgical procedure they are to receive (as determined by a
medical doctor) and the price of that procedure in the marketplace. Intermountain has not
provided or been contracted to provide surgical services to Plaintiffs.

Although

Intermountain might be considered a market player, it does not constitute the
"marketplace" for surgical services. Moreover, lntermountain has not been designated as
an expert in this case, is not qualified as an expert, and has no intention of testifying as an
expert.

Therefore, Intermountain' s opinions regarding what is "reasonable and

customary" or its opinions regarding what documents would be important for such a
determination is not relevant or admissible. Finally, Farmers has not demonstrated a
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need for this information. Farmers can determine what is "reasonable and customary"
through expert testimony

5.

Fanners did not meet its burden that the production of information
regarding Intennountain's qualifications to provide expert testimony
is relevant or proportional.

Intermountain has not been designated as an expert and has already represented to
the District Court and to the parties in this case that it is not qualified as an expert and has
no intention of providing any expert testimony. (Id., p. 5,

11

10-11.) Intermountain

should not have to attend a 30(b)(6) deposition to reiterate the same.
The District Court abused its discretion and improperly denied Intermountain's
request for a protective order. As such, Intermountain respectfully requests that this
Court grant its petition for extraordinary relief and direct the District Court to issue a
protective order prohibiting Farmers from seeking additional information that has not
already been produced either by way of production of documents or through 30(b)(6)
depositions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant IntermoW1tain's petition for
extraordinary relief, reverse the decision of the District Court, and direct the District
Court to issue a protective order prohibiting Farmers from seeking additional information
from Intermountain.
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DATED this 24th day of October, 2017.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Karra J. Porter
Scott T. Evans
Kristen C. K.iburtz
Attorneys for Petitioner

•

28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 24th day of October, 2017, a copy of the foregoing
BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT was emailed to the following and also two true
and correct copies were mailed to:

Lloyd R. Jones
LAW OFFICE OF LLOYD R. JONES
P.O. BOX 258829
Oklahoma City, OK 73125
lloyd.jones@farmers.com
Gary L. Cooper
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third A venue, 2nd Floor
P .O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205
gary(a),cooper-larsen.com
Brent M. Johnson
Administrative Office of the Courts
450 South State Street, 3rd Floor
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
brentj@utcourts.gov
Brett R. Boulton
FLICKINGER SUTTERFIELD & BOULTON
3000 North University A venue, #300
Provo, Utah 8404
brett@fsutah.com

Karra J. Porter
Scott T. Evans
Kristen C. Kiburtz
Attorneys for Petitioner

29

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to UR.AP. 24(f), Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant hereby certifies that
the foregoing brief contains a proportionally spaced 13-point typeface and contains 6,396
words, as determined by an automatic word count feature on Microsoft Word 2010,
including headings and footnotes, and excluding the table of contents, table of authorities,
and the addendum.

Karra J. Porter
Scott T. Evans
Kristen C. Kiburtz
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant

30

•

Addendum 1
Order
May 31, 2017

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial Dlstrict
JU~

IN TIIE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STAffi-AF

ey-

Clelt

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IGNACIO BUENROSTRO and ESTHER
BUENROSTRO,

ORDER ON NON-PARTY'S MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 160902137

WHITNEY A. NESBITT and JACOB C.
LOVELAND,

Judge Royal I. Hansen

Defendants.

This matter came on for a telephone hearing on Tuesday, May 9, 2017, on a Motion for
Protective Order filed by non-party Intermountain Surgical, LLC ("IMS"). 1 Plaintiffs' counsel,
Brett R. Boulton, Flickinger, Sutterfield & Boulton did not participate. Defendants were
represented by Gary L. Cooper of Cooper & Larsen; and IMS was represented by Scott Evans of
Christensen & Jensen. Following the May 9 hearing, the Court requested counsel for IMS and
counsel for Defendants to prepare and simultaneously submit proposed orders for consideration.
Both parties filed Proposed Orders in accordance with the Court's Order on or about May 16,
2017. The Court, having fully reviewed all relevant pleadings and law to the Motion for
Protective Order, having considered the argument of counsel and having now been fully

.

informed, orders as follows .
Rule 26(b) allows discovery of any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to a claim or
defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality. The disputed
1 IMS included a request for attorney fees in their Motion for Protective Order. Based on the Court's decision,
outlined infra, the Court denies IMS's request for attorney fees.

discovery involves a subpoena and a 30(b)(6) deposition directed to Th1S seeking information
about (1) the business model/plan of IMS to determine if it has acted as a medical provider or as
a finance company in this case; (2) the factual foundation for the estimated costs of surgery
provided to the Plaintiffs by IMS to detennine if the estimate represents reasonable and
customary medical expenses or collateral source evidence about how the Plaintiffs intend to pay
for their medical expenses; and (3) the contractual and financial relationship between IMS and
Dr. Huntsman who provided causation opinions and surgical recommendations at the request of
IMS and who has been designated as a "retained expert" by the Plaintiffs to testify concerning
causation, surgical necessity and reasonable and customary charges for medical treatment.
There is no claim that the disputed discovery involves privileged material. Therefore, the
question is whether the disputed discovery involves material which is relevant to a claim or
defense and is proportional. The collateral source doctrine does not render the disputed
discovery irrelevant. IMS is arguably a collateral source because it is a financial services
company which provides litigants like the Plaintiffs in this case with a method to pay for the
surgery recommended by Dr. Huntsman. IMS, however, argues that it is also a medical service
provider which contracts with third parties to provide the place and personnel to perform the
surgery recommended by Dr. Huntsman. This dispute about the role IMS plays makes the IMS
business model/plan and factual foundation for the cost estimate IMS provided to the Plaintiffs
relevant and discoverable. The collateral source doctrine does not bar the disputed discovery
because there is a dispute whether the cost estimate is a collateral source or is evidence of
reasonable and customary charges for medical services.

IMS further argues that even if the requested discovery is relevant it is not proportional
because IMS is a non-party. The party seeking discovery always bears the burden of showing
proportionality.
By its own arguments, IMS occupies multiple roles in this case, including acting as a
medical services facilitator which arranged for the Plaintiffs to be examined by Dr. Huntsman to
determine if causation and surgical necessity existed and as a potential financial provider which
would finance the surgery recommended by Dr. Huntsman. It is also important that Dr.
Huntsman has agreed to act as a retained expert in this case to testify on causation, medical
necessity and reasonable and custo~ charges for medical treatment. Considering the needs of
this case, the requested discovery is reasonable to determine the factual foundation for the IMS
estimate of surgery and to explore the financial relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman.
This is because it was IMS that connected the Plaintiffs with Plaintiffs' retained expert, Dr.
Huntsman.
The information sought is accessible and available to IMS from its own business records
and the burden or expense of providing the requested information is not excessive. Discovery of
this information will facilitate a pre-trial determination of collateral source evidence and bias.
The information sought is not cumulative or duplicative of other information already produced in

this case. The information sought by subpoena and 30(b)(6) deposition is within the control of
IMS and the information sought cannot be obtained from another source that is more convenient
and less burdensome or less expensive. The Defendants have been denied the opportunity to
obtain this information to date because of the limited response by IMS to a subpoena and
because oflMS's refusal to appear at a scheduled 30(b)(6) deposition. Therefore, the discovery
is proportional.

Accordingly, the Court orders that, in addition to the records and documents already
produced in response to the subpoena served on IMS, IMS shall designate and produce a
30(b)(6) witness or witnesses who can testify about the matters described below at a time and
place to be determined by the parties and non-parties. Furthermore, IMS shall produce in
advance of the 30(b)(6) deposition documents and tangible things in its possession and control
which document or form the basis for answering the matters on which the witness is being
produced for examination pursuant to rule 30(b)(6):
1. All business licenses issued to Intennountain Surgical, LLC to operate an ambulatory
surgical facility from December 18, 2014 to present;
2. All licenses issued by the Utah Department of Health to Intermountain Surgical, LLC to
operate an ambulatory surgical facility from December 18, 2014 to present;
3. All accreditations issued to Intermountain Surgical, LLC in connection with its operation
of an ambulatory surgical facility from December 18, 2014 to present;
4. The number of surgeries Dr. Huntsman performed in 2016 for which he or his business
entity was paid by Intennountain Surgical, LLC;
5. The total fees IMS paid Dr. Huntsman in 2016 to perform surgeries for clients
Intermountain Surgical, LLC referred to Dr. Huntsman for surgical evaluations;
6. When, how, and by whom Esther Buenrostro was referred to lntermountain Surgical,
LLC to obtain the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014;
7. When, how, and by whom Ignacio Bu Buenrostro was referred to Intermountain Surgical,
LLC to obtain the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014;
8. All data, documentation or other information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical, LLC
to prepare the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Esther Buenrostro;

9. All data, documentation or other· information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical, LLC
to prepare the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Ignacio Buenrostro;
10. The identity and expert qualifications of any employee, agent or representative of
Intermountain Surgical, LLC who intends to testify as an expert in this litigation to
establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Ignacio Buenrostro
represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community where the services
were provided and the surgery was performed;
11. The identity and expert qualifications of any employee, agent or representative of
lntermountain Surgical, LLC who intends to testify as an expert in this litigation to
establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Esther Buenrostro
represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community where the services
were provided and the surgery was performed;
12. All data, documentation, or other information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical,
LLC to establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Esther
Buenrostro represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community,
including but not limited to data, documentation and information from ConsulMed, LLC
and/or FAIR Health, Inc. and/or other consultants;
13. All data, documentation, or other information relied upon by Intermountain Surgical,
LLC to establish that the surgical cost estimate dated December 18, 2014 for Ignacio
Buenrostro represents usual, customary and reasonable charges for the community,
including but not limited to data, documentation and information from ConsuIMed, LLC
and/or FAIR Health, Inc. and/or other consultants;

14. The portion of the Intermountain Surgical, LLC surgical cost estimate dated December
18, 2014 for Ignacio Buenrostro that represents profit, interest, finance charge, risk of
capital loss, or similar exposure;
15. The portion of the Intermountain Surgical, LLC surgical cost estimate dated December
18, 2014 for Esther Buenrostro that represents profit, interest, finance charge, risk of
capital loss, or similar exposure;

16. The identity of all documents contained in the file maintained by Intermountain Surgical,
LLC for Ignacio Buenrostro;
17. The identity of all docwnents contained in the file maintained by Intermountain Surgical,
LLC for Esther Buenrostro.

PROTECTIVE ORDER
Notwithstanding the foregoing, IMS's request for a Protective Order with respect to the
use of information and materials this Court may require IMS to produce herein is granted as
follows:
1. The information that IMS is required to produce pursuant to this Order will be deemed
confidential, private and protected and shall be used solely for the purpose of conducting
this litigation and not for any other purpose whatsoever. To be subject to the protections
of this Protective Order, IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman shall designate the
documents as "Confidential" or "Private."
2. None of the documents, materials, items, or information produced by IMS, subsequent to
the date of this Order shall be distributed outside of or leave the possession of the
attorneys in this litigation without prior order of the Court. If a party wishes to disclose
any of the documents referenced herein, that party must file a motion with the Court.

3. All documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein shall be designated as
"CONFIDENTIAL" or "PRIVATE" if filed with the Court and shall be filed in a sealed
envelope with the notation thereon that the contents are filed pursuant to this Protective
Order and that the envelope shall not be opened or its contents disclosed (other than to
the Court in-camera) until an Order of the Court is entered after notice to the parties and
non-parties.
4. Nothing in this Protective Order shall be deemed to preclude any party or non-party from
seeking and obtaining additional protection from the Court regarding the treatment of
documents or other material covered by this Order.
5. Within sixty (60) days after the termination of this action, each party shall assemble all

documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein and shall either (i) return
such documents and things and all copies thereof to ™S, or (ii) destroy the documents
and things and all copies thereof and provide written certification of such destruction to

IMS.
So Ordered this ?

)

day of May, 2017.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 160902137 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

BRETT R BOULTON brett@fsutah.com
GARY L COOPER gary@cooper-larsen.com
LLOYD R JONES lloyd.jones@farmersinsurance.com
SCOTT T EVANS Scott.Evans@chrisjen.com
06/01/2017

/s/ CHERI LINDSLEY

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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LLOYD R. JONES Bar# 6757
PETERSEN & ASSOCIATES
Mailing Address
PO Box 258829
Oklahoma City, OK 73125-8829
Physical Address
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 328-5555
Facsimile: (801) 524-0998
lloyd.jones@farmers.com
GARY L. COOPER, Bar #13602
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
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P. 0. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182
gary@cooper-larsen.com
Counsel for Defendant
IN THE TIIlRD ruDICIAL DISCTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAVIER VIGUERAS-AMEZCUA,
Plaintiff,

DECISION AND ORDER
Case No. 160903969
Judge: Matthew Bates

vs.

NOAH SHOEMAN,
Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on Thursday, December 8, 2016, on Plaintiffs
Statement of Discovery Issues and the Motion for Protective Order filed by the non-parties,

January 11, 2017 01 :49 PM
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lntermountain Surgical, LLC ("IMS"), Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC ("Canyon Crest'') and Salt
Lake Orthopedic Center/Dr. Kade Huntsman ("Huntsman"). Plaintiff was represented by
Jordan P. Kendall of Eisenberg, Gilchrist & Cutt; Defendant was represented by Gary L. Cooper
of Cooper & Larsen; and the non-parties were represented by Scott Evans of Christensen &
Jensen.
The Court read the submissions by the parties and the non-parties, heard oral
arguments and after considering the submissions, the case law and the arguments, the Court
grants in part and denies in part, the Plaintiffs Statement of Discovery Issues and the Motion for
Protective Order filed by the non-parties as detailed below.
Ut. R. Civ. P. 26{b) allows discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
a claim or defense of any party if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality...."
Neither the parties nor the non-parties claim that the disputed discovery involves privileged
material. Therefore, the question before the court is whether the disputed discovery involves
material which is relevant to a claim or defense and is proportional. The Plaintiff and the nonparties have argued that the discovery is not relevant and the non-parties have argued that the
disputed discovery is not proportional. The Defendant has argued that the disputed discovery is
not prohibited by the collateral source rule, is relevant and is proportional under the Ut. R. Civ. P.
26 standards.

The collateral source doctrine states that a tort feasor may not reduce his damages by
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the amount that a plaintiff receives from collateral sources. In that sense, IMS is a collateral
source because it provides a benefit to the plaintiff and provides a way for the plaintiff to pay
for the costs he has incurred. The most primary collateral source evidence here is the evidence
of a financial relationship between IMS and the Plaintiff in this case and has already been
disclosed. This is the collateral source evidence that should not come in at trial when we get
there, because the jury does not need to know or should know about whatever the financial
arrangement is between IMS and the Plaintiff, whether that bill will ever be paid, whether it is
paid in installments, whether interest is accruing or not and the fact that IMS has a lien on any
judgment that may be obtained so that IMS can get its money back. The collateral source rule
does not by itself bar the discovery requested at this stage of the litigation.

Even though in its financial disclosure it seems to say that they are not a medical
provider, IMS appears to have multiple roles. One of the roles is to provide medical services or
at least coordinate medical services, and the other is to provide financial services. Therefore,
while IMS is a collateral source, IMS is also a medical provider. In determining whether
requested discovery is proportional the court must weigh the fact that IMS has multiple roles in
this case. IMS has represented that it leases a surgical suite from canyon Crest and owns the
equipment in the surgical space. There is some evidence that IMS is augmenting or making the
Statement of Account allegedly higher than what was charged by the providers to account for
the fact that it is covering the Plaintiffs bills and providing essentially a collateral source for him.
With this understanding the court will allow the defense to get behind that initial bill and look a
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little bit deeper. Essentially, the Court is ordering the non-parties to basically turn over their file
as it pertains to Mr. Javier Vigueras-Amezcua. The Defendant is entitled to at least look at the
costs that IMS incurred in coordinating those services for the Plaintiff. However, the court will
not require IMS to provide invoices for any medical surgical supplies or DME supplies. These
are items that are commonly used by many medical providers and there is plenty of
information available to Defendant about the cost of these items generally.

Defendant's request for discovery into the tax information and payments by or to nonparties like IMS, Huntsman and Canyon Crest is beyond what is pertinent to the Plaintiff in this
case, and imposes a burden on non-parties that is not proportional under Ut. R. Civ. P. 26. In
addition, Dr. Huntsman has already submitted an Affidavit in which he denies a financial
interest in IMS and/or Canyon Crest. If the defense can later on get some evidence to show
that there is some financial relationship beyond just being a doctor and an independent
contractor, the Court will absolutely reconsider this. Therefore, Defendant's request for tax
information and payments by or to the non-parties is denied for now.

The court now turns to the specific subpoenas served upon the non-parties by the
Defendants. In addition to the records and documents already produced in response to those
subpoenas, the non-parties shall produce the following documents:

I. Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC ("Canyon Crest") shall produce the following in response
to the subpoena served by the defense:
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•

The Canyon Crest Surgical Center invoice/bill for the facility charge for the Two
Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier ViguerasAmezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 2016;

•

The form used in 2015 by Canyon Crest MedicaVCanyon Crest Surgical Center
to disclose to patients about the ownership or investment by Salt Lake
Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T. Huntsman in Canyon Crest
Medical/Canyon Crest Surgical Center;

•

The form used in 2016 by Canyon Crest Medical/Canyon Crest Surgical Center
to disclose to patients about the ownership or investment by Salt Lake
Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T. Huntsman in Canyon Crest
Medical/Canyon Crest Surgical Center;

•

The form used in 2015 by Canyon Crest MedicaVCanyon Crest Surgical Center
to disclose to patients about the relationship with the manufacturer(s)/supplier(s)
of the Surgical Implants/Supplies used in the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc
Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest
Surgical Center on January 16, 2016;

•

The form used in 2016 by Canyon Crest MedicaVCanyon Crest Surgical Center
to disclose to patients about the relationship with the manufacturer(s)/supplier(s)
of the Surgical Implants/Supplies used in the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc
Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest
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Surgical Center on January 16, 2016; and
•

All licenses which were in force and which had been issued to Canyon Cr~st
Surgical Center by any regulating entity at the time the Two Level Anterior
Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) was performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at
Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 2016.

2. Salt Lake Orthopedic Center/Dr. Kade Huntsman ("Huntsman") shall produce the
following in response to the subpoena served by the defense:
•

The Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic/Dr. Kade T. Huntsman invoice/bill for Dr.
Huntsman's professional services for the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc
Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest
Surgical Center on January 16, 2016, and all pre- and post-surgical
treatment;

•

The form used in 2015 by Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T.
Huntsman to disclose to patients about the ownership of or investment
in lntermountain Surgical, LLC: and

•

The form used in 2016 by Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic and/or Dr. Kade T.
Huntsman to disclose to patients about the ownership of or investment
in lntermountain Surgical, LLC.

3. Intermountain Surgical, LLC ("IMS") shall produce the following in response to
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the subpoena served by the defense:

•

The Canyon Crest Surgical Center invoice/bill for the facility charge for
the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on
Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16,
2016;

•

The Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic/Dr. Kade T. Huntsman invoice/bill for
Dr. Huntsman's professional services for the Two Level Anterior Cervical
Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon
Crest Surgical Center on January 16, 2016

•

The Anesthesiologist invoice/bill for the anesthesia services provided for
the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF) performed on
Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center on January 16,
2016;

•

The Physicians Assistant invoice/bill for the Physician Assistant services
provided for the Two Level Anterior Cervical Disc Fusion (ACDF)
performed on Javier Vigueras-Amezcua at Canyon Crest Surgical Center
on January 16, 2016; and
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•

The invoice/bill for any medical services or supplies paid by
Intermountain Surgical, LLC for treatment provided to Javier ViguerasAmezcua. However, the Court will not require IMS to provide invoices
for any of the medical surgical supplies or DME supplies.

Production of the rest and remainder of the documents and material requested by the
defense in the subpoenas is denied without further order by the Court. The defense shall pay
reasonable copy costs for the documents produced by the non-parties. All documents not
previously produced, but produced in response to this Order shall not be shared or
communicated to anyone outside of personnel in the law offices defending the Defendant
without further order of the Court. Counsel for the non-parties shall prepare an appropriate
protective order consistent with the oral pronouncement of the order of the Court.
The order is entered by the Court as evidenced by the dated electronic signature at the
top of this document
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Karra J. Porter, 5223
Scott T. Evans, 6218
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Karra.Porter@chrisjen.com
Scott.Evans@chrisjen.com
Attorneys for lntermountain Surgical, UC, Canyon Crest Surgical 11, UC, and Dr. Huntsman
IN THE 11IlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

JAVlER VIGUERAS-AMEZCUA,

Plaintiff:

PROTECTIVE ORDER

Case No.: 160903969

vs.
NOAH SHOEMAN,

Judge Matthew Bates

Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on Thursday, December 8, 2016, on Plaintiff's Statement
of Discovery Issues and the Motion for Protective Order filed by the non-parties, Intermountain
Surgica~ LLC ("IMS"), Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC ("Canyon Crest") and Salt Lake
Orthopedic Center/Dr. Kade Huntsman (''Huntsman"). Plaintiff was represented by Jordan P.
Kendell of Eisenberg, Gilchrist & Cutt; Defendant was represented by Gary L. Cooper of Cooper

& Larsen; and the non-parties were represented by Scott Evans of Christensen & Jensen.
The Court read the submissions by the parties and the non-parties, heard oral arguments
and after considering the submissions, the case law and the arguments, the Court grants the nonparties' Motion for Protective Order as follows:
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I. This Order applies to all documents, materials, items, or information produced pursuant to
this Court's order and after December 8, 2016, whether in tangible or electronic form, such as
electro-magnetic storage and computer storage disks or other electronic media, which is produced
by IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman pursuant to subpoenas served by Defendant in this litigation
are deemed confidential, private and protected and shall be used solely for the purpose of
conducting this litigation and not for any business or other purpose whatsoever.
2. To be subject to the protections of this order, IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman shall
designate the documents as "Confidential" or ''Private".
3. None of the documents, materials, items, or information produced by IMS, Canyon Crest,
and Huntsman pursuant to subpoenas served by Defendant in this litigation shall be distributed
outside of or leave the possession of the attorneys in this litigation without prior order of the Court.
If a party wishes to disclose any of the documents referenced herein, that party must file a motion
with the Court.
4. All documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein shall be designated as
"CONFIDENTIAL" or "PRIVATE" if filed with the Court and shall be filed in a sealed envelope
with the notation thereon that the contents are filed pursuant to this Order and that the envelope
shall not be opened or its contents disclosed (other than to the Court in camera) until an Order of the
Court is entered after notice to the parties.
5. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to preclude any party or non-party from seeking
and obtaining additional protection from the Court on the treatment of documents or other material
covered by this Order.
6. Within sixty (60) days after the termination of this action, each party shall assemble all
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documents, materials, items, or information referenced herein and shall either (i) return such
documents and things and all copies thereof to the IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman, or (ii)
destroy the documents and things and all copies thereof and provide written certification of such
destruction to the IMS, Canyon Crest, and Huntsman.

In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Ejiling Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule 10(e),
this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.
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Approved as to form this 12th day ofJanuary, 2017.

EISENBERG, GILCHRIST & CUTI

Isl Jordan P. Kendall signed w permission
Jordan P. Kendall
jkendell@ecglegal.com

Approved as to form this 12th day of January, 2017.

COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

Isl Gary L. Cooper signed w permission

Gary L. Cooper

gary@cooper-larsen.com

Approved as to form this 12th day ofJanuary, 2017.

PETERSEN & ASSOCIATES
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Isl Lloyd R.. Jones signed w permission
Lloyd R.. Jones
Lloyd.jones@farmers.com

Approved as to form this 12th day of January, 2017.

CHRISTENSEN & IBNSEN, P.C.

Isl Scott T. Evans
Scott T. Evans
Scott.evans@chrisjen.com
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K.arra J. Porter, 5223

Scott T. Evans, 6218
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Karra.Porter@chrisjen.com
Scott.Eyans@chrisjen.com
Attorneys for Intermountain Surgical, LLC

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

RAMBEAU SALISBURY,
Plaintiff:
vs.

THE LNING PLANET, INC., a Utah
Corporation, DBA THE LIVING PLANET
AQUARIUM; and JOHN DOE, an individual,

INTERMOUNTAIN SURGICAL'S
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Case No.: 130905519
Judge Laura Scott

Defendant.

Intermountain Surgical, LLC (hereinafter "IMS") and Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC
(hereinafter Canyon Crest) filed a joint Motion for Protective Order with respect to Defendant's
requests for 30(b)(6) depositions of IMS and Canyon Crest. The motion was fully briefed and heard
on August 11, 2015 before the Honorable Laura Scott. Peter L. Mifflin appeared on behalf of
Plaintiff Rambeau Salisbury, Paul M. Belnap of Strong and Hanni appeared on behalf of Defendant
The Living Planet, Inc., and Karra J. Porter and Scott T. Evans of Christensen & Jensen appeared on
behalf of Intermountain Surgical, LLC.
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Having already responded to Defendant's request to produce documents, IMS and Canyon
Crest objected to Defendant's taking of the 30(b)(6) depositions as well as the scope of the 30(b)(6)
Notices and Subpoenas Duces Tecum served on IMS and Canyon Crest. Judge Scott, after hearing
argument from counsel, and being fully advised,
ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1. The Court hereby grants the Motion for Protective Order filed by IM:S and Canyon Crest.
2. The Court finds the business relationship between IMS and Canyon Crest is not relevant to
the ultimate issue, which is whether the charges from IM:S to the Plaintiff are customary and
reasonable. Defendant is not permitted to perform discovery or make further inquiry into the
business relationship between IMS and Canyon Crest. Likewise, Defendant is not permitted
to perform discovery on the issue of IMS' s markup or profit margin in relation to what their
vendors charge for products or services.
3. Subject to paragraph 2 of this order, Defendant will be allowed to take the 30(b)(6)
deposition of Canyon Crest, if it so chooses.
4. Subject to paragraph 2 of this order, Defendant will be allowed to take the 30(b)(6)
deposition of IMS concerning the billings rendered with respect to the above Plaintiff and
concerning information that would typically be provided in a medical bill from a similarly
situated medical billing provider to a similarly situated patient to the extent not already
provided.
5. Any pricing analysis that IMS or Canyon Crest has performed, or continues to perform, are
confidential and proprietary trade secrets which are not subject to discovery. This
information is also irrelevant to the ultimate issue, which is whether Th1S' s charges to the
Plaintiff are customary and reasonable.
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6. IMS's and Canyon Crest's request that the information they produce pursuant to Defendant's
subpoenas be deemed confidential is granted. The information that has been produced and
which may be produced is confidential and shall not be used for any purpose outside of the
above captioned litigation.

7. The request for attorney fees associated with this motion has been withdrawn. Therefore,
attorney fees are not awarded

- - - - - - - E N D OF O R D E R - - - - - - - In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Ejiling Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule l0(e),
this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.

Approved as to form this 11 th day of
December, 2015.

ls/Paul M Belnap, signed with permission
Paul M. Belnap
Nicholas E. Dudoich
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for The Living Planet
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of December, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing

INTERMOUNTAIN SURGICAL'S PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER with the Clerk of the Court using the efiling system, which sent
notification of such filing to the following:
Paul M. Belnap
Nicholas E. Dudoich
STRONG & HANNI
102 South 200 East, Suite 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Rambeau Salisbury
8638 West Park Street
Copperton, Utah 84026

Via US Mail

Isl Judy Garrett, Secretary

December 141 2015 10:29 AM
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